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Afghanistan is a beautiful, but savage and hostile country. There 
are no resources, no huge market for selling goods and the inhabitants 
are poor. So the obvious question is: Why did this country become a tar-
get of aggression of the biggest powers in the world? I would like to an-
swer this question at least in the first case, when Great Britain invaded 
Afghanistan in 1839. This year is important; it started the line of con-
flicts, which affected Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th century and as we 
can see now, American soldiers are still in Afghanistan, the conflicts 
have not yet ended. 
The history of Afghanistan as an independent country starts in the 
middle of the 18th century. The first and for a long time the last man, 
who united the biggest centres of power in Afghanistan (Kandahar, Herat 
and Kabul) was the commander of Afghan cavalrymen in the Persian 
Army, Ahmad Shah Durrani. He took advantage of the struggle of suc-
cession after the death of Nāder Shāh Afshār, and until 1750, he ruled 
over all of Afghanistan.1 His power depended on the money he could 
give to not so loyal chieftains of many Afghan tribes, which he gained 
through aggression toward India and Persia. After his death, the power of 
the house of Durrani started to decrease. His heirs were not able to keep 
the power without raids into other countries. In addition the ruler usually 
had wives from all of the important tribes, so after the death of the Shah, 
there were always bloody fights of succession. There is actually one im-
portant descendant of Ahmad Khan: Shah Shuja Durrani. He was the 
first Afghan Shah, who accepted the British mission into his country. 
The British envoy, Montstuart Elphinstone, came to Peshawar in 1809.2 
The good results of their negotiations were destroyed due to the removal 
of Shah Shuja from the Afghan throne by his brother, Mahmud Shah 
Durrani. However there was one important result. Shah Shuja was rather 
untypically taken under the wings of the East India Company and given a 
residential house in Ludhiana. He played a huge role in future events. 
The reason why Great Britain started to be concerned about af-
fairs in Central Asia was the Napoleonic wars.3 Britain saw the Treaties 
                                            
1 See more P. ZADEH-MOJTAHED, Small Players of the Great Game. The Settlements 
of Iran’s Eastern Borderlands and the Creation of Afghanistan, London 2004. 
2 L. M. RUNION, The History of Afghanistan, Westport 2007, p. 74. 
3 See more C. FOWLER, Chasing Tales. Travel Writing, Journalism and the History of 
British Ideas about Afghanistan, New York 2007. 
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of Tilsit as a threat to the security of India and started to negotiate trea-
ties with all their neighbours. Instead of the already mentioned discus-
sion with the Afghan Shah, British also came to Sindh, Persia and Sikh 
Empire. Negotiation with Sindh took place in 1808; the first negotiation 
broke down, but second expedition returned with a clause of eternal 
friendship and a promise of emirs: that no French will be let into their 
country. Negotiations were also in motion in Persia. The first envoy, Sir 
John Malcolm, did not succeed, but the second one, Sir Hartford Jones, 
negotiated the British-Persian Treaty on 12th March. The Treaty con-
tained several articles, but the most important for our subject were those 
about Afghanistan and foreign policy. Persia undertook to not let any 
foreign army go into their territory and to help India in case of any 
threat. Britain promised material and financial help in case of a defensive 
war, and in the 9th article to not interfere with the conflict between Af-
ghanistan and Persia. This promise was especially important, because for 
almost the whole first half of the 19th century, Britain tried to omit it 
from the treaty. The last treaty was signed in Lahore, the capital city of 
the Sikh Empire. The British envoy, Charles Metcalfe, met here with the 
Sikh Maharajah, Ranjit Singh, and they signed an allied treaty, which set 
the border between India and the Sikh Empire on the Sutlej River and 
was the base of long term friendship between those powers. 
In 1813, British representatives mediated the Peace of Gulistan. 
The peace agreement ended nine years of war between Russia and Per-
sia. Britain was in a tricky situation. Because of the Napoleonic wars, 
Britain financially supported Russia and because of the treaty of 1809, it 
had to support Persia too, so it was in their interest to end this war. Brit-
ain also wanted to prevent conflicts between Russia and Persia in the 
future. The instrument for this goal was the treaty of 25th December 
1814.4 Britain had to keep some articles from the treaty of 1809 includ-
ing the unwanted 9th article. London also promised £150,000 for equip-
ment and training soldiers in case of proven aggression against Persia. 
The Persian Shah claimed to try to convince the other Central Asian 
countries to join their commitment of not letting foreign armies into their 
country. 
The situation inside Afghanistan did not indicate any danger for 
India. After the dethroning of Shah, Shuja Durrani took over the initia-
tive of a tribe called Barakzais. Mahmud Shah was forced to retreat to 
Herat. The main power was moved into the hands of Barakzai vizier 
Futeh Khan. Futeh was in charge of Kabul until 1818, when he was as-
                                            
4 See more E. INGRAM, Britain’s Persian Connection, 1798–1828: Prelude to the Great 
Game in Asia, Clarendon Press 1992. 
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sassinated by Sadozais in revenge for a raid of his son, Dost Mohammad 
Khan, on Herat. This event started a civil war in Afghanistan. Ranjit 
Singh took advantage of it and from 1818 to 1819 he occupied the Mul-
tan province, containing Kashmir, Jammu, and most importantly, Pesha-
war. This town had huge economical and historical value for Afghan 
monarchs. The majority of inhabitants were Pakhtuns (ethnical “Af-
ghans”). The civil war ended in the 1826, when the inner fight between 
the Barakzai chieftains was decidedly won by Dost Mohammad Chan. 
Victorian historians usually valued his moral character highly. But con-
temporary historians are not so positive about his character. He gained 
the power “partly through his own powers of leadership, partly because 
he was even more successful at intrigue and treachery than his surviving 
brothers, partly because he had been Fateh Khan’s favourite, and partly 
because he was supported by the Qizilbash palace guard, his mother 
having belonged to one of the noble Qizilbash families which lived 
around Kabul.”5 
In the first half of the 19th century, Central Asia was a target of 
two main powers: Russia and Great Britain.6 The war between Persia and 
Russia from 1826 to 1828 had a big impact on their relations. Russia 
took advantage of a doubtful article in the Treaty of Gulistan and an-
nexed Gokcha. Persia took it as cassus belli and wanted to attack Russia. 
Persia wanted to use the Decembrist Revolt as an advantage. The British 
saw this conflict as Persian aggression and did not help, in accordance 
with the agreement of 1814. Persia lost the war, which resulted in a very 
catastrophic peace of Turkmenchay. The policy of foreign secretary Lord 
Canning in this case was a target of major criticism by the Duke of Wel-
lington and Lord Ellenborough.7 Ellenborough warned the government 
that this treaty would cause an increase of Russian influence on Persia. 
Charles Metcalfe had similar thoughts: “were we ever to expect any es-
sential aid from Persia, in the time of our own need, we should most as-
suredly find ourselves miserably deceived and disappointed. If ever Rus-
sia be in the condition to set forth army against India, Persia most prob-
ably will be under her banners.”8 
Problems were also caused by the uncertain leadership in foreign 
policy of British India. There were two major institutions: The “East 
                                            
5 T. A. HEATHCOTE, Afghan Wars 1839–1919, Spellmount 1980, p. 11. 
6 See more P. HOPKIRK, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia, Oxford 
1990. 
7 C. W. CRAWLEY, Anglo-Russian Relations 1815–40, in: Cambridge Historical Jour-
nal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1929, pp. 47–73. 
8 J. A. NORRIS, The First Afghan War 1838–1842, Cambridge University Press 1967, 
pp. 23–42. 
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India Company” and the Foreign Office, and neither of them were clear-
ly in the front. Both offices were sending their own envoys and in many 
cases enforced different policies. Russian expansion also did not threaten 
only Persia, but the Osman Empire was in danger, too. The Duke of Wel-
lington even said: “All parties in Europe must view this Treaty of Peace 
in the same light as we do. They may not have such reasons as we may 
have to look with jealousy and anxiety at its consequences; but they must 
all consider it in the same light as the death blow to the independence of 
the Ottoman Porte, and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinction 
of its power.”9 Lord Ellenborough saw the problem similarly. The book 
by Colonel Lacy Evans On the Practicability of an Invasion of British 
India, which was describing the possibilities of Russian progress through 
Central Asia to India, had a big influence, too. He quotes many im-
portant men in his book, for example Sir John Malcolm: “The frontier of 
the Indus is the most vulnerable part of our Eastern Empire.”10 This 
danger was rather illusory and even British politicians were aware of it; 
but they were worried about the possible approach of foreign forces near 
Indian borders. According to Sir John Malcolm, this presence could lead 
to “danger and incitement to riot“11 in British India. This reality would 
have had unwanted consequences, such as the necessity to increase the 
amount of soldiers allocated in British India for its potential defence. 
This would lead to the reduction of the profit that the East India Compa-
ny received from India. 
Wellington’s government tried to push Russia as far from India as 
possible. The main instrument for achieving this goal was the commer-
cial influence. All diplomatic journeys in Central Asia were declared as 
trade opening. The primary aim of the policy of Lord Ellenborough dur-
ing his two years in office at Board of Control was the expansion of Brit-
ish trade throughout Indus. After the fall of Wellington’s government, 
the new president of the Board of Control (Charles Grant) continued in 
this policy. It was even more peaceful; the new Governor-general of In-
dia Lord Bentinck was not to go into any military actions including cas-
es, where negotiations broke down. 
In 1830, a young British officer, Alexander Burnes, took off on 
an expedition. Burnes was not a very experienced diplomat, so the expe-
dition was without much success, but it laid the bases for the next, more 
experienced, envoy of Henry Pottinger. Both diplomats were very im-
                                            
9 Ibidem, p. 27. 
10 EVANS, De Lacy, On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India, London 1829. 
11 M. A. YAPP, British Perception of Russian Threat to India, in: Modern Asia Studies, 
Vol. 21, No. 4, 1987, p. 658. 
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portant in our story. Henry Pottinger succeeded, thanks to his decisive 
attitude and to stressing dangers like ambitions of Sikh Empire or Af-
ghan ruler, Dost Mohammad Khan. Nevertheless, the first visit of Henry 
Pottinger did not bring any concrete result; however his second visit in 
January 1832 ended up in a commercial treaty. Emirs agreed not to inter-
rupt British trade on Indus, with the exception of military material. Brit-
ain wanted to settle British resident into the biggest and capital-type city 
of Sindh, Hyderabad, but they did not succeed in this demand, due 
Emir’s fear of losing independence. 
In January 1832, Alexander Burnes started his second journey. 
His final destination was Bokhara, but his first stop was Kabul. He ar-
rived at the biggest city of Afghanistan on 1st May 1832.12 The behav-
iour of Dost Mohammad Khan was excellent and Alexander Burnes 
quickly started to feel sympathetic toward him. Burnes wrote later about 
their first diner: “The conversation of the evening was varied, and em-
braced such a number of topics, that I found it difficult to detail them; 
such was the knowledge, intelligence, and curiosity that the chief dis-
played.”13 The opinion of Alexander Burnes is probably the main reason 
why Dost Mohammad Khan has such a big moral credit in the historical 
literature of the 19th century. It has to be said that the motivation for this 
behaviour was not without self-interest. Dost Mohammad Khan wanted 
to convince Britain to help him against the Sikh empire with his ambition 
to get Peshawar back. Burnes had visited the British candidate for the 
Afghan throne, Shuja Durrani, some months earlier and thought that 
Dost would be a much better ruler for British interests. His plan was 
simple. He proposed to wait for the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and 
then make an alliance with Dost Mohammad Khan, who he hoped would 
cooperate with the British in an expansion of trade along Indus and the 
pacification of frontier areas of British India. Burnes continued to Bo-
khara after his departure from Kabul. He arrived to Bokhara in June 
1832. His main instruction was to discover the extent of Russian trade in 
Bokhara. Burnes tried to contact Emir of Bokhara, but the guards did not 
let him into the palace, because did not have a diplomatic status. His 
message for the Indian government about Russian trade involved de-
scribing certain spheres where Britain could succeed. The Russian posi-
tion in metals was ironclad; Burnes saw the possibilities to get on in 
trade with manufactured goods and cotton. As a last part of his journey, 
Burnes visited Persia, where he met the crown-prince and Shah. On 18th 
January 1833, he headed back to India. 
                                            
12 A. BURNES, Travels into Bokhara, London 1834, p. 130. 
13 Ibidem, p. 136. 
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Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja Durrani started to draw outlines of 
their future alliance in March 1833. Negotiations were not difficult; their 
interests were very similar. They signed the treaty on 12th March 1833. 
Ranjit promised to help Shuja with restoration, and on the other hand 
Shuja promised to officially admit Sikh sovereignty over the already 
occupied lands of Punjab (Peshawar, Kashmir etc.). Shuja wanted to gain 
British support, but because of instructions from London, Governor-
General Lord Bentinck could not intervene. 
Another power invaded Afghanistan before Shuja, along with 
Ranjit, could even start. Persian Shah, Mohammad Mirza, tried to fulfil 
his ambition to take control of Herat. Britain was not very pleased, but 
could not do anything because of the 9th article of the treaty of 1814. 
Britain wanted to come to an understanding with Russia. Foreign secre-
tary Lord Palmerston made an arrangement with Russian Foreign Minis-
ter, Count Nesselrode, in which they agreed to try to end the conflict 
with diplomatic negotiations. In the end, it was not necessary. Moham-
mad Mirza had to return to Teheran because of the death of his father, 
Abbas Mirza, and because of a fight of succession that was beginning. 
In the beginning of the year 1834, the plans of Ranjit and Shuja 
finally came to be. The army of the ex-emir started its march into the 
depths of Afghan country in January; a force of approximately 22,000 
men.14 After a slight complication with the wild tribes of Sindh, the army 
fought a battle near Rohri on 9th January 1834. Shuja won and could 
march towards Kandahar. Fights continued for several months; the deci-
sive battle took place on 2nd July 1834, near Kandahar. Shuja stood 
against the Barakzai brothers, who ruled Kandahar (the most important 
of them was Kohaldir Khan). Dost Mohammad Khan was also present; it 
was quite surprising because the Barakzai brothers had not had very 
harmonic relations so far. For the moment their alliance celebrated victo-
ry, but conflicts inside the family were imminent after the battle, when 
Kohaldir denied Dost access to the city. Nevertheless, Dost gained even 
more influence in Kabul. Local religious leaders awarded his efforts with 
new titles: “Commander of the Faithful” or “Commander of the Cham-
pions of the Islam”.15 Not everything was good for the Afghan ruler at 
the moment. Ranjit didn’t want to give up his promised gains and sent 
his best general, Hari Singh, to conquer Peshawar. He had had a huge 
influence on city’s inner politics since 1819, but the formal ruler was still 
member of the Barakzai family, Sultan Mohammad Khan. Hari Singh 
drove him out of the city. 
                                            
14 A. MOHAMMED, The Mohamedzai Dynasty, Kabul 1959, p. 12. 
15 M. LAL, Life of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, London 1846, p. 169. 
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Dost Mohammad Khan wanted to use this as cassus belli and al-
lied with Sultan Mohammad Khan with the goal of re-conquering Pesh-
awar. This alliance was even more surprising than the one with Kohaldir 
Mohammad Khan, because the relationship between Dost Mohammad 
Khan and Sultan Mohammad Khan was very unfriendly. However this 
time they had common interests. In the beginning of the year 1835 they 
tried to march towards Peshawar. Unfortunately for Dost Mohammad 
Khan, the Sikhs managed to convince Sultan Mohammad Khan to give 
up his plans and betray the ruler of Kabul. They promised him his pos-
sessions in Punjab and a safe place to live. The plans of Dost Moham-
mad Khan failed, so he had to find another way to fulfil the ultimate goal 
of his foreign policy: Peshawar. 
On the 29th of April the government changed again in Great Brit-
ain. Whigs won the election and their leader, Lord Melbourne, became 
Prime Minister. Lord Palmerston maintained the Foreign Office despite a 
slight resistance from the Prime Minister. Lord Hobhouse took charge of 
the Board of Control. He had to decide who would be the next Governor-
General. Before the final election Charles Metcalfe took over the office 
as temporary governor. The exiting Governor Lord Bentinck wrote a 
very long memorandum about the situation in India. He was aware of a 
possible attack of Russian-Persian alliance; he was not concerned about 
direct a Russian attack, but saw the danger in Persian ambitions towards 
Herat. He also predicted possible problems with the Sikhs in case of the 
death of Ranjit Singh. 
The Primary goal of the new government was a reduction of Rus-
sian influence in Persia. The newly appointed British envoy in Teheran, 
Henry Ellis, was told by Palmerston to warn the Shah about any attempts 
to take control of Herat. Palmerston was sure that a Persian attack would 
have negative consequences for Britain: “Whether Persia is successful 
or not, her resources will be wasted in these wars, and her future means 
of defence against the attacks of Russia must be diminished.”16 Losing 
the war could result in Persia’s political dependence on Russia. 
In July 1835, the office of Governor-General of India was offered 
to former First Lord of Admiralty, Lord Auckland. He had many experi-
ences with politics; he was the President of the Board of Trade or “Mas-
ter of the Mint”. However colonial administration was new to him. His 
appointment probably had its roots in the fact that “Melbourne, Palmer-
ston, Auckland and Hobhouse formed a very tight little group within the 
Whig party.”17 Auckland accepted the offer and set out to India in Sep-
                                            
16 NORRIS, p. 77. 
17 Ibidem, p. 78. 
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tember. His farewell speech was quite promising. He said that he 
“looked with exultation to the new prospects opening before him, afford-
ing him an opportunity of doing good to his fellow-creatures–of promot-
ing education and knowledge – of improving the administration of justice 
in India – of extending the blessing of good government and happiness to 
millions in India.”18 
After his arrival to India, Auckland was a little confused so he 
needed the help from the exiting Governor Charles Metcalfe very much. 
Metcalfe’s influence on Auckland’s decisions was big. The negotiations 
run by Henry Ellis and John McNeill continued in Teheran.19 Both tried 
to convince the Shah not to attack Teheran, but their effort was constant-
ly thwarted by the activity of Count Simonich, the unofficial Russian 
envoy in Teheran. 
At the end of May 1836, Palmerston received alarming messages 
from Teheran. Within the messages, Henry Ellis announced the arrival of 
Afghan envoys from Dost Mohammad Khan.20 This diplomatic expedi-
tion had a simple goal: to get Persian support against the Sikh Empire in 
exchange for support of Kabul against Herat. Fortunately for Britain El-
lis was able to convince the envoys to go back to Kabul without any con-
tracts; but within the following month the next diplomatic expedition 
arrived from Kandahar. The result was the same. If Henry Ellis were to 
be ignored, the Afghan envoys were afraid of British aggression in re-
sponse. Henry Ellis ended his service in Teheran in the summer of 1836 
and was replaced by John McNeill. McNeill had special competences; 
unlike Ellis, he was not under the authority of the Indian Governor-
General, but reported directly to Foreign Office in London. His main 
goal was to erase Article 9 in the British-Persian Treaty of 1809 or 1814. 
Negotiations were going on in India, as well. Auckland was try-
ing to endure the long-term concept “Balance of Power”. He warned the 
Sikh Empire not to adopt an aggressive foreign policy, particularly 
against Sindh. In correspondence with Dost Mohammad Khan, Auckland 
adopted tactics of no promises and remained strict on the policy of only 
business treaties. Three missions to neighbouring countries would re-
solve this complicated situation. 
The first mission was directed at the lands behind Indus and was 
led by Alexander Burnes. The second one had its goal in Sindh, where 
experienced diplomat Henry Pottinger would achieve some good results. 
                                            
18 W. KAYE, History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, London 1857, p. 162. 
19 See more E. INGRAM, In Defence of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, 
1775–1842, London 1984. 
20 HEATHCOTE, p. 18. 
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Last one was led by Claude Wade and would ensure the continued alli-
ance with Ranjit Singh. 
The mission to Sindh had one primary goal: enforce the founda-
tion of British residence in Hyderabad. Henry Pottinger was instructed to 
use the intervention in favour of Sindh which Auckland made in Lahore. 
The secondary goal was the expansion of British trade along the Indus. A 
big opponent of this policy was Charles Metcalfe: “I lament the course 
which you have determined to pursue, for what is now done is but a be-
ginning. We are, I fear, about to plunge into a labyrinth of intervenes 
from which I fear we shall never be able to extricate ourselves. I cannot 
perceive any object worth the risk of the possible consequences of this 
change in our policy, and this departure from that pacific system which 
was essential for the establishment of our political strength and financial 
prosperity.”21 Metcalfe was convinced that Auckland should have left 
the Sindh to Sikh empire and with this decision he had shown his grati-
tude for a smooth alliance with Ranjit. Auckland answer was very com-
plex: “You almost frighten me with your black prognosis. I am far from 
enthusiast upon the subject of the Indus, nor do I dream golden dreams 
of it, or think it the factorum of India as some in England do. But it may 
grow into Commercial importance. Its navigation is an avowed British 
project. I have been moved to secure it and money and pains are spend-
ing and have been spent for it. It is true that this one may lead us further 
than we either wish or foresee, but the most passive policy is not always 
the most pacific; and another course might have led to evils even more 
formidable. In all this you will differ from me and I deeply lament it, and 
whenever you do so I must doubt whether I am in the right. But whether I 
am in the right or wrong it is little good in politics to be long looking 
back on footsteps that are passed. Our thoughts must be given to where 
we may step in advance with most firmness and prudence, and a very few 
days will enable me to see our way more clearly.”22 The letter shows 
without any doubts that Auckland hived off Metcalfe in this time. 
On 17th November 1836, Ranjit Singh finally yielded and defini-
tively gave up the idea of military progress to Sindh. The main cause of 
this action was, without a doubt, British pressure. It should be said that 
this pressure was in a friendly atmosphere and did not harm the relation-
ship between the countries. The problem was that Ranjit’s withdrawal 
bound Britain to orientate her politics to the Sikh Empire and against 
Afghanistan. 
                                            
21 NORRIS, pp. 96–97. 
22 Ibidem, p. 98. 
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Negotiations on Persia were not so successful. Persians did not 
want to give up expansion to Herat and for British diplomacy it was still 
harder and harder to discourage Shah from his expansion. McNeill did 
everything he could and was instructed to leave Teheran in case of Per-
sian attack on Herat. 
Meanwhile, Alexander Burnes started his journey to Kabul. By 
his own words: “On the 26th of November we sailed from Bombay, and 
sighting the fine palace at Mándivee, on the 6th of December, we finally 
landed in Sindh on 13th of the month.”23 
The activities of Count Simonich became even more dangerous 
for British interests in the beginning of 1837. In January, Palmerston 
wrote the letter to the British envoy in St. Petersburg Earl Dunham: “I 
have to instruct your Excellency to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count 
Simonich is acting according to his instructions in thus urging the shah 
to pursue a line of conduct so diametrically opposed to His Persian Maj-
esty’s real interests.”24 Nesselrode replied that the British did not have 
the right information because Count Simonich certainly did not under-
take these steps. By the end of February 1837, Durham was assured that 
Simonich would be called away. From our perspective it is quite sure 
that this move was a cloaking manoeuvre. Nesselrode printed a transcrip-
tion of his discussions with the Shah, where Simonich spoke against 
plans to conquer Herat; however after three months Count Simonich was 
one of the Russian officers who accompanied the Shah’s army to Herat. 
Meanwhile, McNeill sent a memorandum which arrived in Cal-
cutta at the end of March and to London at the end of April. He wrote 
that the main problem was the decision between two main tribes (Sa-
dozais and Barakzais) of Afghanistan, but he saw the main goal as the 
unification of Afghanistan.25 McNeill’s opinions were very important for 
his officials both in India and London, but in London his influence was 
more visible. Auckland hoped that after possibly helping Afghanistan 
against Persia, there would be an option to fix relations between Afghan-
istan and the Sikh Empire. Auckland also had a long-term plan to build a 
dike of prosperous states along Indus which would, in times of danger, 
protect the Indian border as British allies. 
Letters written in November 1836 by Auckland arrived in Febru-
ary 1837 which, in case negotiations failed with Persia, ordered McNeill 
to fall back from Teheran. McNeill wrote immediately to Palmerston 
                                            
23 A. BURNES, Cabool: Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in that City, 
London 1842, p. 1. 
24 NORRIS, p. 103. 
25 F. MACALISTER, Memoir of the Right Honourable Sir John McNeill and his Second 
Wife Elisabeth Wilson, London 1910, pp. 200–203. 
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arrived to McNeill: “I doubt whether these measures proposed by Indian 
Government would have desired effect. I am not quite satisfied with ref-
erence to the temper and feelings of the Shah of this Court, whether it 
would be advisable to produce the alienation which must result from the 
measures proposed by the Indian Government, unless we are prepared to 
go further and to insure success in the object for which we resort to 
threats, by convincing the Persian Government that we are prepared to 
act as well as threaten.”26 
In this perspective it is important to mention that British foreign 
policy was divided. McNeill reported directly to the Foreign Office, but 
he had to follow orders from the Indian government, too. So, he always 
could say that orders did not coincide and do the policy he wanted. Lon-
don and Calcutta were also both dependent on his messages as sources of 
information. Palmerston sent McNeill to Teheran because of their shared 
opinions on policy. They were both slightly more aggressive in foreign 
policy than Auckland. McNeill’s plan was quite simple: help Dost Mo-
hammad Khan unify all of Afghanistan and use his state as a wall against 
Russian and Persian expansion into India. This was not acceptable for 
Auckland because he did not want to lose the alliance with the Sikh Em-
pire, which was very important in the strategic plans of British India. 
The situation was messed up even more when Dost Mohammad 
Khan tried to attack Peshawar, a long-term target of Dost’s foreign poli-
cy. The attack failed. The commander of the army and Dost’s son Akbar 
Mohammad Khan won the battle of Jamrud and almost took control over 
Peshawar. However lack of proper logistics prevented this achievement 
and the armies had to withdraw. This episode was very important. From 
then on, every contact with Kabul was quite risky in perspective of the 
relation between the British Empire and the Sikhs. And relations with 
Sikhs were crucial for the defence of India. Auckland had the same opin-
ion as that which was articulated by the Commander in Chief of Indian 
Army, Henry Fane, almost a year before these events: “A case could 
hardly occur which would render it wise for us to overturn the Sikh pow-
er, or to over-run the Punjab, or to extend ourselves to the Westward... 
Every advance you might make beyond Sutlej to the Westward, in my 
opinion adds to your military weakness. If you want your empire to ex-
pand, expand it over Oude or over Gwalior, and the remains of Maratha 
Empire. Make yourselves complete sovereigns of all within your bounds 
but let alone Far West.” 
Meanwhile, Alexander Burnes got closer to Kabul and received 
complete instructions, from William Macnaghten. The mission was offi-
                                            
26 NORRIS, p. 107.  
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cially declared to be strictly commercial.27 However, Burnes was told not 
to give any direct answers to questions from the Emir. He also was in-
structed to try to conciliate relations between the Sikhs and Kabul and 
“observe the general feelings towards the British and Russian Govern-
ments.”28 Before he had received these instructions, he had heard about 
the battle of Jamrud. It gave him the idea to suggest offering Peshawar to 
Dost in exchange for an increase of British influence in this area and 
military assistance against Persia. These ideas were very close to the 
thoughts of John McNeill but not to the thoughts of Burnes’s main supe-
rior, Lord Auckland. Auckland valued more highly the alliance with the 
Sikhs than a possible improvement of relations with Kabul. 
 In June 1837, Herat’s government sent an offer of very favoura-
ble peace to the Persian Shah, but he refused it. McNeill wrote immedi-
ately to Palmerston that diplomacy was failing and that it was inevitable 
that something more aggressive would need to be done. McNeill asked 
Auckland to submit a warning as the highest political authority in the 
area, but it was too late. On 23rd June 1837, the march of the Persian ar-
my in the direction of Herat started. The Russians officially dissociated 
from this move; Nesselrode sent Palmerston a dispatch from Simonich, 
where the Count apologized that he was not able to discourage the Shah 
from his expansion into Herat. It was a lie, but this correspondence be-
tween both ministers improved their relations concerning Afghanistan 
slightly. 
 Burnes’s mission was now, because of the Shah’s action in Herat, 
even more political. In another instruction there was more emphasis put 
on the improvement of Sikh-Afghan relations. He also proposed that the 
Peshawar could be given back to Sultan Mohammad Khan if the Emir 
gave up his negotiations with Persia. The Herat events could serve as a 
good catalyst for rapprochement. Unfortunately, the first meeting was 
undertaken before these instructions arrived in Kabul, so Burnes had to 
scrape by with the old ones. 
 Alexander Burnes arrived in Kabul on the 20th of September 
1837. His first impression of Emir was very positive and the rest of the 
expedition saw him similarly. As he wrote later: “we were received with 
great pomp and splendour by a fine body of Afghan Cavalry, led by 
Ameer’s son, Akbar Khan.”29 It is obvious now that Emir wanted to pro-
vide this impression, so he prepared very well, but the expedition did not 
see this reality. The negotiations were very difficult; Dost Mohammad 
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Khan rejected the offer of Barakzai rule in Peshawar. He wanted another 
Barakzai than Sultan Mohammad Khan to rule in this city. Burnes sent 
this information to Calcutta. 
 New instructions finally arrived in October. Dost was very sorry 
for his contacts with Persia and criticized his brothers from Kandahar 
who had Persian envoys at their court. The neuralgic point of the negoti-
ation had always been Peshawar. Dost Mohammad Khan did not want 
his cousin, Sultan Mohammad Khan, to rule there, so the proposition 
from Britain was nearly unacceptable. Because of the nature of his for-
eign policy and situation in Afghanistan, he could not give up the effort 
to take this city. His one and only strategy was to convince Britain that 
he was a much better ally than Ranjit Singh and then capture the city 
with their help. So, he cooperated with Alexander Burnes extensively, 
but the situation became even more complicated when Russia sent their 
own envoy. 
 Burnes’s good relationship with Dost Mohammad Khan can be 
easily illustrated by quoting his letter to Macnaghten concerning this 
envoy: “Dost Mohammad Khan said that he had come for my counsel on 
the occasion; that he wished to have nothing to do with any other power 
than the British; that he did not wish to receive any agent of any power 
whatever so long as he had a hope of sympathy from us.”30 Lieutenant 
Vitkevich arrived in Kabul on the 19th December 1837. Burnes described 
him as “intelligent and well informed on the subject of Northern Rus-
sia.”31 The main difference between Russian and British diplomacy was 
simple: the Russians promised everything. The first proposal was really 
tempting. Vitkevich offered Russian help against the Sikhs with annual 
subsidies and the only thing he asked as the reward for all this was an 
improvement in relations. Meanwhile, the Barakzai brothers in Kandahar 
continued with their contacts with Persia. They sent the son of one of the 
most prominent Barakzais in the city to negotiate in Teheran. Burnes 
panicked and sent an offer of money and personal assistance in case of 
an attack on Kandahar. In addition, he sent Lieutenant Leech to try to 
negotiate with local the Sirdars in ending their contacts with Persia. He 
probably knew that he was contravening his competences. His defence 
was easy, he argued that there was no time: “In the critical position in 
which I was situated I saw no course left but that which I have followed. 
My belief is that Herat may withstand the attack of the Persian, but if 
not, and the Shah marches to Kandahar, our own position in the East 
becomes endangered, and the tranquillity of all the countries that border 
                                            
30 KAYE, p. 188. 
31 BURNES, p. 262. 
Jiří Kárník 
The Causes of the First Anglo-Afghan War 
 
192 
on the Indus.”32 Burnes also openly protested against the direction of 
Auckland’s foreign policy and tried to convince the Governor-General to 
adopt policy against the Sikhs and in support of the Afghans. “Though 
the messenger has arrived and delivered his letters, I trust that the 
friendly devotion of Dost Mohammad Khan is asking in my Advice and 
next handing to me all the letters brought by the emissary will remain in 
your Lordship’s mind, as proofs of sincerity and conciliation, highly to 
be appreciated, and the more so as the British have as yet made no 
avowal of support to his power, while he has received declarations from 
others, the sincerity of which can no longer be questioned.” He further 
spoke against an alliance with the Sikhs: “It is undoubtedly true that we 
have an old and faithful ally in Maharajah Runjeet Singh, but such an 
alliance will not keep these powers at a distance, or secure to us what is 
the end of all alliances, peace and prosperity, on our country and on our 
frontiers. I am yet ignorant of the light in which your Lordship or Maha-
rajah Runjeet Singh have viewed the overtures of Dost Mohammad Khan 
regarding Peshawar.”33 The influence of Dost Mohammad Khan is very 
evident in these letters. 
 These letters had to go through the Sikh Empire. The British en-
voy in Lahore, Claude Wade, wrote down his own opinion in his acces-
sory letter, where he argued the course of policy which Burnes had rec-
ommended. He inclined more toward Auckland’s policy to restore Shah 
Shuja. Negotiations with Dost Mohammad Khan also broke down due to 
his exaggerated demands. His ordinary demands were well known: pro-
tection against the Sikhs and the gain of Peshawar. But he also wanted 
British help to gain control of Kandahar and Herat. This condition went 
absolutely against British interests, as Auckland saw them.34 
 At almost the same time, Macnaghten and Colvin sent letters to 
Burnes, in which they criticized his unauthorized promises to Dost Mo-
hammad Khan in the matter of Kandahar. Burnes tried to work it out, but 
did not succeed. He tried to play his hand the best he could. Burnes told 
Dost every condition he had: Emir should stop contacts with Persia and 
Russia; he should also send away Vitkevich and give up all his claims of 
Peshawar. In addition, he should respect the independence of Kandahar 
and Herat and try to establish better relations with his brothers. Dost 
Mohammad Khan surprisingly accepted his conditions but also demand-
ed withdraw all of the Sikh army from Peshawar. The first signal that 
something was wrong was the unexecuted departure of Lieutenant Vit-
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kevich. Burnes described this treaty as a huge success, but he was cheer-
ing too soon. The very influential group at Kabul’s court, which argued 
in favour of an alliance with Russia and Persia, put huge pressure on 
Emir. It was obvious for him too that he could not fulfil his ambition for 
an alliance with Britain, but he was not sure if an alliance with Russia 
would do the trick. Despite his doubts Emir decided to try, and he an-
swered the letters which Vitkevich had brought a few months earlier. 
This action exceedingly angered Burnes. He immediately wrote to India 
that he would like to depart from Kabul because of the obvious failure of 
negotiations. Dost Mohammad did not want to lose this option, so he 
tried to play for time, but he did not succeed, and after a few letters be-
tween Auckland and Emir, Alexander Burnes departed on 26th April 
1838.35 
 Henry Pottinger was more successful in Sindh. He was able to 
sign a treaty of British residence in Hyderabad with Nuseer Mohammad 
and Nur Mohammad, two of the most influential emirs of Sindh. 
 The siege of Herat had been the thorn in the eye of British policy 
in central Asia for the last several months. McNeill bombarded Auckland 
and Palmerston with demands in a condemnatory letter against Persian 
action. McNeill wrote Palmerston in February 1838 to: “This on act of 
interference would doubtless cause some immediate irritation, but it 
would cause less than would be produced by our interfering to Kandahar 
after Herat shall have fallen, and if we must ultimately (incur the odium 
of) arrest(ing) the progress of Persia in Afghanistan, it appears to me 
that it can be most advantageously incurred for the preservation of the 
whole country, including so valuable a position as Herat.”36 At this time 
McNeill did not have any specific orders concerning his behaviour to-
wards the Persian Shah. McNeill saw it as freedom to act so he began the 
journey to Herat. In April, Palmerston received a message about a Rus-
sian expedition to Orenburg and Bukhara, so he immediately wrote to 
McNeill to gather some information about it. 
 McNeill arrived at the Persian encampment on 6th April 1838. 
The first thing what he had to do was to write to his superiors. He re-
peated his opinion that the only option to rescue the alliance with Persia 
was to prevent their armies from capturing Herat. He also declared that 
he could mediate a possible negotiation between the Persian Shah and 
the ruler of Herat, Shah Kamran. McNeill was convinced that the Rus-
sians did not see the Herat adventure as so important to risk open hostili-
ty against Great Britain. 
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 The May 1838 was a very important month. Palmerston approved 
McNeill’s mission and told him to send an envoy to Bokhara to find out 
what ate Russians were planning for this strategically very important 
city. Palmerston also received very disturbing messages from the British 
envoy in Odessa, which contained information about Russian plans to 
march through Bokhara to reach Afghanistan. 
 In May, Auckland also established the shape of his policy. From a 
very careful policy of a balance of power he turned to a policy of alliance 
with the Sikhs and turned away from Barakzais in Afghanistan. In a 
memorandum from 12th May he accurately described the causes of this 
change. Apart from the generally praised Persian move towards the Indi-
an border, Auckland articulated the idea that interference was inevitable, 
because letting Afghanistan to his faith would be an admission of total 
defeat. He also thought that the aid from Sikhs would be impossible 
when Dost Mohammad Khan was still on the throne in Kabul. Auckland 
definitively decided to send William Macnaghten to Lahore to negotiate 
a treaty with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja. On 22nd May Auckland offi-
cially announced to the East India Company that Burnes’s mission had 
failed and that the Indian government had started to negotiate the treaty 
with Ranjit and Shuja. In this letter he also mentioned the last infor-
mation from Burnes about Russian progress through central Asia and 
noted that they contained “unequivocal demonstrations therein noted of 
the extent to which Russia is carrying her system of interference on the 
very threshold of the British India possessions. I need not repeat my anx-
iety, even though the rapid march of events may oblige me to act without 
your instructions, to be favoured with communication of your views upon 
present crisis at the earliest possible opportunity.”37 
 Meanwhile, McNeill was trying to impact the Persian Shah in his 
camp near Herat, but Count Simonich was jeopardising all his efforts. He 
was able to persuade the Shah with promises of land and power, which 
he could gain from a successful siege. This problem was solved very 
early. Palmerston decided to deal with it without any hesitation. On 19th 
June 1838 a small navy army occupied Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf. 
The Persian Shah reacted with a hasty offensive against the still-resisting 
Afghan fortress of Herat. The presence of the Russian deserters led by 
General Isidor Borowski is very important. He attacked on 24th June 
1838, but the attack did not succeed. The Shah’s army got through the 
walls of the fortress, but was not able to gain control of the city. 
 In June, the negotiations with the Sikhs were under way, as well. 
Britain needed their help and not only militarily, but also because they 
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required free passage through Punjab in case of a military expedition to 
Afghanistan. In retrospect, another fact is quite surprising: almost all 
British officials felt sure, that installation of the Shah Shuja on the Af-
ghan throne would be very easy. However, Auckland still hesitated and 
doubted. 
 The negotiations with Ranjit Singh were led by William Mac-
naghten and the envoy from Kabul, Alexander Burnes. British envoy to 
Lahore, Claude Wade, and Shah Shuja were present too. The negotiation 
was not easy, but on 26th June 1838 the so called “Tripartite Treaty” was 
signed. This alliance was very important because it was the basis of fu-
ture conflict. We should therefore quote some of the most important arti-
cles of the treaty: 
“1st. Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk disclaims all title on the part of 
himself, his heirs, successors, and all the Suddozyes, to whatever territo-
ries lying on either bank of the river of Indus that may be possessed by 
Maharajah. 
4th. Regarding Shikarpore and the Territory of Sindh the Shah 
will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in 
conformity with happy relations of friendship subsisting between the 
British Government and Maharajah. 
15th. Shah Shoojah ool-Moolk agrees to relinquish for himself, his 
heirs and successors, all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute over 
the country now held by Ameers of Sindh. 
17th. Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk shall not attack or molest his 
nephew, the ruler of Herat. 
18th. Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk binds himself, his heirs, and suc-
cessors, to refrain from entering into negotiations with any foreign state 
without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh Govern-
ments.”38 Auckland sent another message to the Secret Committee of the 
East India Company on 13th August 1838, where he explained the rea-
sons for closing the Tripartite treaty: “In almost every direction we 
seemed to be surrounded by undisguised foes or doubtful friends. It oc-
curred to me that a more intimate alliance between Runjeet Singh and 
the British Government would damp the spirit of disaffection all over 
India, and I deem it fortunate that a combination to the westward afford-
ed me the means of engaging that powerful chief in a design which, while 
it will frustrate the views of our enemies on the other side of the Indus, 
must dishearten those who might have entertained secret views of hostili-
ty towards us in other quarters.“39 Auckland described unification with 
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Ranjit as the only one possibility. The analysis of Sir Henry Fane, Com-
mander in Chief of Indian Army, which revealed that war with the Sikhs 
would be very difficult, had an influence on this policy, too. In the future 
it was shown that he was right. 
 When it started to became really clear that the Persians would not 
be able to conquer Herat, a discussion started about the necessity of a 
British invasion into Afghanistan in the case of an unsuccessful siege. 
Auckland, however, thought that he had no other option; he saw it as a 
choice between passivity and action and he saw no point in passivity. 
 In the meantime, John McNeill left Herat and sent his representa-
tive, Colonel Charles Stoddart. When John McNeill was still at the 
Shah’s court he got the information about Russian progress through cen-
tral Asia. McNeill wrote later: “A Russian army of from 10,000 to 
15,000 men, which had been collected at Orenburg under the command 
of General Perowski, in anticipation of the Shah’s success at Herat ac-
tually invaded Khiva.” He saw great danger in this situation: “By the 
concerned action of Russia and Persia the sovereignty of the Shah would 
have been established in Kandahar and Cabool as well as at Herat un-
der the guarantee of Russia; Khiva would have become a Russian prov-
ince, extending along the course of the Oxus probably to the northern 
slopes of the Hindoo Koosh – the British and Russian empires would 
then been in contact.”40 It’s important to note, that John McNeill was the 
only source of information for the majority of government in London. 
 During August several month old messages from India arrived in 
London. President of the Board of Control, Hobhouse, approved the oc-
cupation of Kharg; by this action he confirmed Palmerston’s action in 
the name of East India Company and British-Indian Government. At the 
end of August, the Foreign Office received the messages about 
McNeill’s departure from Herat, about Russian intrigues during the 
Siege, and about Auckland’s negotiations with Ranjit. After these mes-
sages, Palmerston saw the situation as follows: “The true Measure to 
take would be to make a great operation in Afghanistan; to push on Run-
jeet Singh, send an English Corps to act with his army; to drive the Per-
sians out of Afghanistan and to reorganise that country under one Chief; 
and to pay Runjeet by giving him Peshawar and Cashmeer. A good Af-
ghan state connection with British India would make a better Barrier 
than Persia had been, because it would be more under our control. We 
should have the same kind of geographical pull upon such a state that 
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Russia has upon Persia.”41 It is clear that Palmerston agreed with Auck-
land’s policy, and so did the government; Lord Melbourne thought that 
passivity was more dangerous than action. 
 In October some good news finally arrived. McNeill wrote about 
the successful negotiations of Charles Stoddart in Herat. The Shah with-
drew from Herat, but the main reason was the failed attack in June. 
McNeill, however, appealed the the British Government to still enforce 
the active policy and install a new Shah on the throne in Kabul. 
 Palmerston was also negotiating with the Russian envoy in Lon-
don, Pozzo di Borgo. Nesselrode transmitted a letter through this envoy, 
in which it “was distinctly denied that any project for disturbing the 
British possessions in India had ever presented itself to the mind of the 
emperor.”42 This time, however, Nesselrode actually dismissed Count 
Simonich from the Persian court. The withdrawal of the Russians started 
a bigger discussion about Afghanistan in London, but the most important 
people in government did not stop supporting Auckland. The most ar-
ticulated problem of financial demands was keeping the Shah on the 
throne in Kabul. Auckland did not consider this as crucial, and he was 
not alone; almost all of his colleagues had the same opinion. They all 
believed that Shuja would be popular and there would be no problem in 
installing him. 
 The most important and most quoted document of the British 
campaign in Afghanistan is “Simla Manifesto”. It’s the document that 
explains the causes of the British invasion to Afghanistan. It was written 
by William Macnaghten, but the text is from the mind of Lord Auckland. 
It explains the reasons why Lord Auckland decided to go to Afghanistan. 
The primary reason was the impossibility of an agreement between Dost 
Mohammad Khan and Ranjit Singh: “It was evident that no further inter-
ference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a 
good understanding between Sikh Ruler and Dost Mohammad Khan, and 
the hostile policy of latter chief showed plainly that, so long as Kabul 
remained under his Government, we could never hope that the tranquilli-
ty of our neighbourhood would be secured.” The second important rea-
son was the Persian siege of Herat: “The attack upon this city was a most 
unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued notwith-
standing the solemn repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the 
court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommoda-
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tion had been mad and rejected.”43 His last reason was the defence of 
the Indian border and the desire that India would be surrounded by 
friendly states with no offensive thoughts. This manifest was written 
exactly how the London government wanted. So, the real main reason: 
the progress of Russia through central Asia, was withhold and the Per-
sian threat was exaggerated. It is possible to say that the Palmerston 
agreement with the manifesto started the war. 
 The war itself went well for Britain in the beginning. Britain con-
quered all of Afghanistan in half a year, but then problems began. In-
stalling a new Shah proved to be very difficult. He picked the wrong 
people for the government and his country never forgave him for letting 
the infidels into their country. The British managed to control Afghani-
stan for almost two years, but in November 1841 an uprising started,44 
which led to catastrophe. The mistakes of military and political officers 
led to the bloody march from Kabul to Jalalabad, where 16 000 people 
died and only around 20 survived from the entire Kabul garrison.45 Not 
even children or women were spared. The British Army sought revenge 
for this massacre by burning the old Kabul Bazaar, but Dost Mohammad 
Khan returned to the throne a year later (1843) and pursued, not surpris-
ingly, anti-British policy in central Asia for the next 10 years. The Brit-
ish did not achieve any of the goals they had established before the war 
and for which they even started the war. 
 The First Afghan war is also very interesting from a current per-
spective. Maybe the most powerful nations ended their campaign simi-
larly here. The British had to lose for two more times to realize that Af-
ghanistan is a country that can be conquered but cannot be controlled. 
The Soviet Union has made the same mistake and the USA is making it 
now. 
 
Abstract 
Afghanistan is a land where war seems to last forever. The goal of this 
article is to show how the first intervention of western power in Afghani-
stan started. The main conflict in Central Asia in the 19th century was a 
long-term struggle between Russia and the British Empire over the influ-
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ence in this part of the world, usually called, “The Great Game.” Russia 
started to march towards Khanates such as Bokhara or Khiva and 
strengthened its influence in Persia. Concerns about a Russian advance 
and the security of the Indian western border grew in London and British 
India at the same time. Afghanistan experienced a long and bloody fight 
of succession between two branches of the Durrani tribe, Sadozais and 
Barakzais, in the beginning of the 19th century. The Barakzais won this 
civil war and Dost Mohammad Khan became the Emir of Kabul. Never-
theless, Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Sikh state, took control of Peshawar 
during the civil war and this created the chasm of interests between Af-
ghanistan and the Sikh state, which could never be overcome. The article 
tries to explain how these aspects merged and led to the war, and at-
tempts to clarify who holds the dominant part of responsibility in the 
final decision that resulted in a start of the armed conflict. 
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